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Introduction
The Air Force is losing the battle to defend cyberspace and each day the United States faces increasing threats and attacks against its networks aimed at the theft, manipulation, or destruction of information. The loss of information caused by inadequate cyber security has inflicted unacceptable and often incalculable damage to US national and economic security interests. 1 The Air Force has dedicated considerable resources trying to manage and secure information and information systems in cyberspace. Air Force personnel have tried to create a number of secure operational environments in the cyberspace domain, all based on technology developed in the 1950s and 1960s for an open, highly fragmented, system centric, architectural environment. One major problem with this approach is that the Air Force frequently fields systems and applications that are often outdated upon implementation and susceptible to attack in that open environment. Another problem with this approach is that the infrastructure used to create the current environment was, in most cases, commercial off the shelf (COTS) products, designed and built by our adversaries. Instead of this approach, the Air Force could redefine what is meant by an -Air Force Operational Environment‖ and move to a more cloud centric approach where the priorities are set by the cloud and not by applications or individual needs.
The Air Force should develop the doctrine, strategies, applications, and infrastructure necessary to create, defend, and dominate its own -Air Force Cloud.‖ Implementation of an Air Force Cloud will affect the operational environment which includes the six phases of the kill chain process (find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess). The systems that provide war fighters with the capability to execute the kill chain are connected by a common thread, cyberspace via the cyber network. One of the objectives should be to reduce the latency in the kill chain in a contested cyber environment where US dominance has not been This paper will provide provocative answers to these three research questions. It will start by examining the historical evolution of roles the Air Force has played in the cyberspace domain and some of the challenges created along the way. It will look at the early days of the -World Wide Web‖ and later efforts by the Air Force to stand up a Cyber Command. The paper will also examine recent policy changes at the Department of Defense (DoD) that have reestablished the Air Force organize, train, and equip (OT&E) role with respect to presenting forces and capabilities to the Combatant Commands for cyberspace operations and the challenges it still faces with operating and defending its own networks. The paper will identify doctrinal and strategic changes that will have to take place to implement an Air Force network to meet its OT&E requirements in a secure environment. It will answer the question of how to shape a secure operating environment and the resources and workforce required to make that concept a reality. Lastly, the paper will present a five-step plan for successfully building a defense-based Air Force Cloud. This plan will include: 1) Building the team; 2) Building security and survivability into the basic system engineering and architectural design of the Cloud; 3) Replacing core infrastructure with technology based on the new Cloud concept; 4)
Designing security to be baked-in to applications in the development process and not bolted on later; 5) Instituting operational security by designing processes and systems that can survive in a contested cyber environment and which are self-healing in order to better recover from damage/attacks. In order to understand how to move forward, the Air Force must first look at its earliest beginning in cyberspace.
Historical Background
As the processing power of computers continues to grow at an exponential rate, the amount of information which can be stored and processed by these machines is also increasing.
In the beginning, most of these machines were in a standalone configuration and the information had to be physically brought to the computer to be processed. Built in 1946, ENIAC is often considered the first supercomputer; it used around 20,000 vacuum tubes and weighed over 30
tons, taking up a tremendous amount of floor space and consuming almost 200 kilowatts of electrical power. 4 The ENIAC led the computer field during the period from about 1949 through 1952 when it served as the main computational workhorse for the nation's scientific problems.
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As was typical of the time, the Air Force often housed its computers in what was referred to as a block house, which was a large building with no windows. The block house usually required one floor for the cooling equipment, one for all the tubes, one for the peripheral devices, and one for personnel. Programs and data were inputted through devices called card readers which often took six to eight hours to process a single stack of cards at a rate of about 150 cards per minute.
Then in 1958, the Seymore Cray's CDC 1604, the first in a series of Cray computers, was built as a fully transistorized supercomputer. 6 As machine capabilities continued to grow and the value of the data stored in them began to be realized, the need to share this data became evident. As has often been the case with advances in technology, the military, through the Rand Corporation, began to fund research to find a way to connect those individual computers so they could share their data. 
Provisional Cyber Command
Understanding the need to control and dominate the cyber environment during military actions, the Air Force set plans into motion to develop an organization called Cyber Command. Cloud, for the OT&E mission with adequate defenses to ensure its survivability/usability during cyber attacks. Before the Air Force can design a Cloud, it must develop the doctrine and strategy to be followed during the design and operation of that Cloud.
Defining Air Force Cyberspace Requirements
Until now, the Air Force has been operating in the cyberspace domain in an environment that was developed without having its core mission as the driving force behind that development. Force must get back to basics and apply the same strategies and doctrine to the cyberspace domain which are applied to air, land, space, and sea domains.
Define the Mission Requirements
The first step in shaping this new operational environment is to define the requirements and capabilities an independent Air Force Cloud would have to provide to the Air Force and Combatant Commanders. Obviously, it must be an enabler for the accomplishment of the Air Force OT&E mission for air, space, and cyberspace. The Air Force must also be able to extend, field, and support an expeditionary capability of that Cloud for the combatant commander. It is then necessary to identify those critical requirements unique to the Air Force, such as the reliable delivery of the Air Tasking Order, and the capabilities necessary to successfully meet those requirements. This will require a fundamental shift in culture and ideology from an offensive to a defensive mindset. Secretary Wynne would argue that in this context, defensive operations not only refer to information assurance and survivability of the network, but also to protecting the ability to conduct offensive operations, if necessary. 19 This view purports that part of the Air Force OT&E mission is to prepare cyber warriors to conduct both offensive and defensive operations in a contested cyber environment.
Inherent in that thought is the fact that, to train cyber warriors, the Air Force must have a cyberspace environment to conduct that training. That does not mean that the actual internet as we know it today needs to be used for that purpose. Just as the military uses simulators and test ranges to train for the air, land, and sea missions, a simulator or test range could be established to train cyber warriors as well. If there is to be an offensive capability within the cyber warrior skill-set, the Air Force Cloud must also include connectivity to the rest of cyberspace for the warrior to conduct his or her specialty. Combined, these highlight the requirement for an Air
Force Cloud capable of meeting the OT&E requirements for air, space, and cyberspace, defensible against our adversaries, expeditionary in nature, providing secure connectivity to the rest of cyberspace, and providing a training environment for future cyber warriors. With this as a foundation for an Air Force Cloud cyberspace mission, it is necessary to develop doctrine and a strategic view on how it should be utilized.
Cyberspace Doctrine and Strategic Defense Strategy
A precursory look at AFDD 2, dated April 3, 2007, provides 25 foundational Air Force doctrine statements that are basic principles and beliefs upon which other AFDDs are built, none of which mention cyberspace. 20 Most could simply be adjusted from reading air and space to reading air, space, and cyberspace. Others would have to incur greater modification to accommodate this new domain. It would also be necessary to add a statement such as -Cyberspace superiority is the desired state before all other combat operations. Attaining cyberspace superiority provides both the freedom to attack and freedom from attack, as well as ensuring freedom to maneuver. Operating without cyberspace superiority radically increases risk to surface and air operations,‖ to the list to make it complete. This statement, much like it did for air power, highlights the importance of gaining cyberspace superiority in the battles of tomorrow. Just as air power increased the speed at which effects could be delivered, cyberspace now makes it possible to deliver effects in nanoseconds rather than minutes or hours.
One of the greatest effects which cyberspace brings to the battlefield environment today is as an enabler of technology, enhancing the capabilities of air, land, sea, and space operations. 
Shaping an Air Force Cloud
The Air Force must reverse many of the trends it has established over the last 15 years if it wants to establish an Air Force Cloud as described above. Cyberspace will have to be looked at as a domain that does not belong to the Air Force. Rather, the Air Force must be able to establish, within cyberspace, an area it can establish, control, and conduct offensive and 
Design a Defensive Cloud
The current Air Force global information grid (AFGIG) is based on an open architectural environment which inherently favors offensive actions. For the most part, it was built with parts and software provided by industry partners who may or may not have Air Force security interest as a top priority. Recent events with both hardware and software suppliers from other nation states have shown how vulnerable our dependence on others to produce these products has made the Air Force. It would be impossible to shut down the AFGIG in today's operational environment and start over without adversely affecting the mission of the Air Force. Instead, the Air Force must begin to deploy a new AF Cloud, designed with defensive capabilities as its foundation and built with government designed or government off-the-shelf products. The most critical assets and data could be moved to the new Cloud immediately, followed by less sensitive or critical requirements. The design of the Air Force Cloud will be critical to being able to successfully migrate data and applications into it to ensure their security.
There are a number of ways to design the Air Force Cloud in such a way as to avoid the threats of intrusion or render them incapable of causing effects within the cloud. For these actions to be effective they must be implemented at the physical, network, and transport layers of the OSI model in figure 1 . At the physical layer, the Air Force should build its own connectivity without utilizing commercial circuits and equipment. The Air Force must develop an organic capability to produce the equipment and programming necessary to ensure its reliability and security. At the network layer, the Air Force could develop a new protocol stack specifically for use by the DoD based on sessions rather than the packets currently utilized by TCP/IP. As discussed earlier, the current IPv4 protocol was implemented in 1983 and is considered an outdated and unsecure protocol. The military would have the option of developing its own protocol, maybe an IPgov in which various security features like IP security and geo-location could be built in and shared across the federal government, while still maintaining a linking capability with both IPv4 and the newer IPv6 (not yet widely used). Another option would be to hide all of our assets other than the gateway equipment behind a network address translation (NAT) and proxy schema. At the transport layer, error-free transmission requirements, as well as end-to-end user authentication, can be written into the session-based protocol used. An example might be using Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) which is designed to address the functions of signaling and session management within multimedia communications. All of these options, and more, will be discussed in greater career field and then details how current 33S and 12X career fields will be converted to meet those needs. This is the wrong approach; it does not provide a true CWO classification capable of fulfilling the Air Force's needs. Currently, a 33S officer can hold almost any degree, including those unrelated to computers. A college-level algebra class does not provide the foundation necessary to perform the tasks required to establish, control, and leverage the cyberspace domain. This approach only focuses on operations within an already established domain and does not provide an answer for the need to establish the domain. There should be a minimum of two specialties within the CWO career field, a 17B and a 17D. One with the skills necessary to establish and control the cyberspace domain and the other capable of leveraging that domain through offensive and defensive operations. Each of these specialties should have a unique set of requirements necessary for entry.
All CWO 17B officers should be required to have a computer programming or electrical/computer engineering degree. They should also be provided specialized training to equip them with the necessary tools to establish and control the new Air Force Cloud. All CWO 17D officers should be required to have a computer engineering or computer science degree.
They should also be provided specialized Air Force cyber training to equip them with the skills necessary to leverage the cyberspace domain by conducting offensive and defensive military operations in cyberspace. While this would require a substantial investment, it is the only way to provide educated and trained combat forces capable of fighting in the cyberspace domain. CWO 17B and 17D career fields, independent of the 33S career field, should be established.
The establishment of a new Air Force career field, with the requisite education and training programs, could take years to accomplish.
Complicating matters is the decline of available civilian sector computer science candidates for entry into a CWO training pipeline (see Figure 2 ). To overcome this challenge, the Air With the 1B1 AFSC, the Air Force has done a great job at identifying core requirements, developing new career fields, and a career path for future cyber system maintainers. Each new cyber maintainer will receive a -Cyber Fundamentals‖ course similar to current maintainers receiving Electronic Principles before progressing on to their core courses to learn their specific AFSC. 26 In addition to these courses, the Air Force should consider providing supplemental and advanced cyber warrior courses to ensure its Airmen have the latest skill sets available and are proficient in applying those skills. Additionally, more work needs to be done in identifying facilities and instructors to provide the new cyber training, where these AFSCs will fit within the 26 Cyber Enlisted Transformation Brief, current Air Force organizational structure, and the number of each AFSC which will be required to accomplish its assigned mission, not to mention the support structure required for such a largescale change in deployment capabilities. The current landscape will look completely different and the way it is conceptualized by the workforce will have to change also.
Create a New Mindset
Changing the parochial attitude of the Air Force as it relates to cyberspace and the mission it will perform in that environment will take both time and effort on the part of senior leaders. Defensive cyber operations are vital to protecting, preserving, recovering, and reconstituting cyber related capabilities before, during, and after an adversary attack. 27 Like air and space, cyberspace is unrestricted by boundaries and has the ability to extend the battlefield to the US homeland. It has also become a great enabler for other warfighting capabilities employed in the other domains. For these reasons, it is extremely important to protect the Air Force's ability to effectively utilize cyberspace in its application of force. This is a paradigm shift from the inherently offensive nature of air operations and the glamour associated with computer network attack. It will also take a considerable amount of new technology, increased budget expenditures, and a greater reliance on internal development to ensure the reliability of an Air Force Cloud. Change of this type will require a review of all of the IT assets and systems within the Air Force and conscious effort to develop a prioritized list based on mission requirements.
An organization as large as the Air Force is unlikely to change overnight. It will take time to develop some of the hardware and software necessary to implement the changes listed above, as well as to educate and train future cyber warriors for the tasks that lie ahead. There will be an interim period where both the AFGIG and the new Air Force Cloud will be utilized.
During this period, legacy systems can be evaluated for relevancy and currency of application and decisions can be made on whether to migrate them to the new cloud or to develop new applications for those processes within the new Cloud. Just as with other changes, this process must be undertaken in a series of steps, each building upon the other until the process is complete. It is important to identify the steps prior to implementation to ensure that all involved in, or affected by the change, have an opportunity to have an input into the plan.
Air Force Cloud Implementation Plan
Unfortunately, the message about the real cyber threats and the steps necessary to avoid or prevent them is not getting the traction it deserves within the Air Force. Dr. Kamal Jabbour, senior scientist at Rome Labs and a key participant in the 2008 Scientific Advisory Board Cyber Study, stated that the Air Force is not ready to operate in a contested cyber environment, putting the Air Force mission at risk. A lack of focus by the Air Force on the development of cyber forces and capabilities has also hindered the service's presentation of these key enablers to the joint warfighter. 28 This conclusion highlights the first step necessary in implementing a plan for building an Air Force Cloud; assembling the team of professionals capable of establishing the new Air Force Cloud and setting priorities for the events necessary to do so. It will also take a considerable amount of new technology, increased budget expenditures, and a greater reliance on internal development to ensure the reliability of an Air Force Cloud. Change of this type will require a team effort, a review of all of the IT assets and systems within the Air Force, and a conscious effort to develop a prioritized list based on mission requirements.
Step 1 critical assets first before all else. As an example, a core router in the conflict area would be more critical than at an individual desktop at a stateside base. Once all of the assets have been prioritized, designing architecture to support those requirements and engineering the systems necessary to meet those requirements in the new Cloud is the next step.
Step 2 -Build Security into System Engineering and Architecture
Confidentiality, integrity, authentication, attribution, and availability are system properties that must be built in during the systems engineering process and during system-ofsystems design. The later in the system lifecycle development process that security is added, the greater the cost of doing so will be and the probability of getting things right the first time The process includes identifying information protection needs at the beginning and using
that to define what security requirements will be necessary to ensure those needs are met. Only after these issues have been addressed can the architectural and engineering process take place, each with a link to user and security to ensure their needs are still being met. Even as one enters the implementation stage of the process, there are checks to make sure that security has not been compromised and the user's needs are being met. 
Figure 3 System Design Process
Step 3 If access to this new Air Force Cloud is to be limited, a holistic approach looking at the physical, application, network, and transport layer must be utilized. This could include, but not limited to, going to centralized security screening for untrusted traffic (firewalls, web proxies for inbound and outbound traffic), developing a new version of the internet protocol stack based on Air Force mission requirements, or utilizing NAT and proxy schemas to hide our assets in cyberspace. The good news with NAT is that it has way of causing incoming session connection requests not work because when a session request comes in from the outside, the NAT device doesn't know to which internal host this request should go. 30 This could be implemented today and would prevent many of the standard threats faced on the network without creating a problem for internal communications or outgoing session requests generated internally.
Changing from packet-based protocols to session-based protocols is also an option. As discussed earlier, using Session-Initiation-Protocol (SIP) which is designed to address the functions of signaling and session management within multimedia communications or a similar type protocol is a viable option. Signaling allows link information to be carried across network boundaries for positive identification of end-point users before access is granted. Session management provides the ability to control the attributes of an end-to-end call. Point-to-point session-based protocols could determine the location of target endpoints through address resolution, name mapping, and link direction. They would allow for identification of endpoint capabilities and security levels and restrict transmissions to only those classifications authorized for that endpoint user. These session-based protocols could be configured to eliminate multiparty connections when security requirements necessitated doing so, requiring the termination of 30 Beijnum, Lljitsch, Everything You Need to Know About IPv6, Arstechnica, 7 March, 2007 both endpoints whenever one end was lost. Another aspect of limiting access to the Air Force Cloud is to ensure it is only used for official business.
Gone are the days when the Air Force can afford to let its employees surf the Web for sports, shopping, and the myriad of other actions personnel are performing on the web each day that are not mission related. Not every desktop or laptop in the Air Force requires access to nonmilitary sites for their daily duties, with most sites needed being behind the portal. This goes back to step 1 of this process where the mindset with the Air Force must change. Internet access from Air Force systems is not a right, but more of a privilege that has restrictions on its application which has been abused or misused by many Air Force members. The rigor built into the core infrastructure identified above must also be carried over to the development of applications.
Step
-Build Application Security throughout Lifecycle
History has taught us that the Air Force focuses on a very small area of application security prior to deployment and even less after it is deployed. The Air Force must learn to expand its focus to include all phases of an applications lifecycle, from development through deployment and decommissioning. In the context of applications security, the Air Force should use the model shown in Figure 5 to ensure all known, necessary aspects of applications security are adapted for full coverage-no -gaps.‖ Applications need to have security baked in, not bolted on after development. Trying to make corrections to the entire code base after development is complete can be problematic and cause software failures and vulnerabilities. The Air Force needs to take responsibility for the development of software programs that handle or process its most sensitive data and not rely on COTS or private companies for this. By building or developing its own applications, it will be easier to utilize emerging polymorphic technologies to defend them. This will also allow for an easier transition to effectively operate and defend the Cloud once established.
Step 5 -Build Operations Security
The Air Force has long known the advantage of maneuver on the battlefield, but has failed to translate that to the cyber environment. It has used static IP addresses for its most critical equipment for years, basically providing its adversaries with a fixed target upon which to focus. Technology is available to change this to polymorphic systems with agility and diversity built in which continually changes addresses, aka maneuverability. between man and machine is the inherent realm of the cyber warrior. A successful cyber strategy depends on the commander's ability to deliver timely effects and power assets to dominate the enemies decision cycle and exploit opportunities as they evolve in the unpredictable -Fog and Friction‖ of war.
33 Automated cyber capabilities allow the commander to establish priorities ahead of time, build in commander's intent into those capabilities, and operate with those capabilities at cyber speed. Only with these types of technologies can the Air Force hope to operate in a contested cyberspace environment to ensure it will be the key enabler it was designed to be.
Summary
Accepting cyberspace as a new warfighting domain implies the need to develop new doctrine and strategies to fly fight and win in that environment. US adversaries are much aware of Air Force increasing dependence on cyberspace and are looking for ways to exploit that dependence. 34 What the Air Force has done to date in cyberspace has had limited success in securing its networks and the current network attack-focused mindset must change. Our first challenge in cyber warfare will likely be to survive an initial attack, recover in a contested environment, and then defeat our adversary.
35
A meaningful strategic defense strategy is possible in cyberspace, without relying on the use of force for self-defense. The first priority in a defense-oriented network is to avoid the threat if at all possible, if not, then one must try to defeat the threat, and if that is not possible, then one needs to be able to survive the threat and continue to operate. The Air Force must create a trusted platform to conduct operations in cyberspace and instantaneously engage/defeat threats and attacks with systems and information 33 Stein, George J., -Information War -Cyberwar -Netwar‖. This all has to happen in a matter of nanoseconds, the speed of the 21 st century.
